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Pending issues in the review of the European market 
abuse rules 
Carmine Di Noia 
he proposed legislative package on market abuse 
comprises two documents: a draft regulation (COM 
2011/651), which will largely replace the existing 
market abuse Directive (2003/6) (MAD) and the level 2 
measures; and a new Directive (COM 2011/654) dealing 
with criminal sanctions. 
Market abuse rules are needed to ensure market integrity 
and investor confidence, to allow companies to raise capital 
and contribute to economic growth, thereby increasing 
employment. 
Rules in place are a necessary but not sufficient condition. 
On the one hand, they need to be technically well-designed, 
proportionate and crystal-clear, avoiding uncertainties in the 
interpretation, especially when there are, correctly, tough 
sanctions. On the other side, regulation needs to be 
complemented by efficient supervision. In integrated 
financial markets, abuses should be regulated in a 
harmonised manner by member states and a timely 
cooperation is therefore necessary among national 
competent authorities, which has not always been the case. 
The text will initially concentrate on the scope and 
definitions – in particular the definitions of insider 
information, insider dealing and market manipulation – and 
the listed companies’ disclosure obligations, including the 
specific provisions for SMEs. Many proposals are rooted in 
the 2007 ESME report.
1 
                                                        
1 See report by the European Securities Markets Expert Group 
(ESME), “Market abuse EU legal framework and its 
implementation by Member States”, 6 July 2007 (hereinafter 
ESME Report) (http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
securities/docs/esme/mad_070706_en.pdf). See also N. 
Moloney, EC Securities Regulation, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008; J.L. Hansen and D. Moalem, “The MAD 
Disclosure Regime and the Two-Fold Notion of Inside 
As the ESME Report illustrated, the existing MAD 
framework has been implemented in many different ways in 
Europe, despite the Lamfalussy approach. This is 
undesirable even if it allowed member states and especially 
their competent authorities in the last decade to overcome 
the fatal flaws of the 2003/6 Directive. 
1.  The notion of inside information 
In 2003, MAD not only regulated market abuse but also fair 
disclosure obligations for listed companies: in particular, it 
provided for the public disclosure of inside information as 
soon as possible by making the same kind of information 
(inside information) the basis both for the prohibition of 
insider trading and for the obligation to disclose. This 
coincidence of notions generated a lot of legal uncertainty, 
especially because market abuse was already the basis in 
many member states for criminal offences. The possibility 
for listed companies to delay disclosure has been severely 
limited by the condition that such delay should not be 
misleading. In order to solve that uncertainty, many member 
states simply did not apply the Directive or circumvented it 
with guidelines of their competent authorities, which proved 
to be valuable at a first glance but often worthless when 
dealing with criminal charges. 
After ten years, the draft Regulation has the merit to 
recognise that a differentiation is needed and goes back in 
distinguishing the information that cannot be abused from 
the information that listed companies has to disclose. 
But it does it in the wrong way: instead of clarifying the 
circumstances when listed companies have to disclose 
                                                                                                  
Information – The Available Solution”, Capital Markets Law 
Journal, 2009, p. 323 and C. Di Noia and M. Gargantini, “The 
Market abuse directive disclosure regime in practice: Some 
margins for future actions”, in Rivista delle società, 4/2009. 
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relevant facts that arise in their own sphere of activities or 
when delaying disclosure is possible, it enlarges the notion 
of inside information not to be abused, by introducing a new 
Article 6.1 (e), relevant only for abuse purposes.
2 
This novelty, never put out for consultation by the European 
Commission, introduces a new case of inside information 
which lacks two criteria hitherto applied to the notion of 
inside information: the requirement of being “precise” and 
price sensitivity.
3 While it is appropriate to consider market 
abuse as warranting criminal sanctions, the violation should 
be carefully described in detail, and not left to the excessive 
discretion of the courts, in order to allow citizens to 
understand easily when they commit an abuse or not. 
The lack of certainty and the extension of the violation as a 
criminal sanction may lead financial intermediaries to limit 
sensibly their trades and reduce liquidity on European 
stocks. It may also reduce the corporate governance 
dialogue, often encouraged by European institutions, 
between companies and shareholders, if the latter feel 
restricted in their ability to trade. It may also severely limit 
the possibility for companies to act in general and operate 
on their shares (despite the provision of Art. 3) and to use 
variable compensation schemes for managers instead of 
granting only fixed compensation, irrespective of the results 
of the companies.
4 
Two major changes are therefore necessary. The new Art. 
6.1, e) should be deleted. The disclosure obligation in Art. 
12 should take into account the ‘old’ definition of inside 
information for disclosure duties of Directive 2001/34/EC;
5 
in any case the requirement for a listed company of “not 
misleading the public” when delaying disclosure of an 
inside information – which is by definition impossible to 
comply with – should be modified in order to allow 
                                                        
2 Inside information also includes information not falling 
within the previous paragraphs relating to one or more issuers 
of financial instruments or to one or more financial instruments 
which is not generally available to the public but which, if it 
were available to a reasonable investor who regularly deals on 
the market and in the financial instrument or a related spot 
commodity contract concerned, would be regarded by that 
person as relevant when deciding the terms on which 
transactions in the financial instrument or a related spot 
commodity contract should be effected. 
3 Although price sensitivity seems to have been supplanted by 
reasonable investor test (Art. 6.2). The proposed extension is 
an adaptation of the UK concept of RINGA (Relevant 
Information Not Generally Available), but without other limits 
(for example, that the information is considered relevant if it 
would be ordinarily the subject of an announcement required 
by law or made by convention – see section 1.5, FSA Code of 
Market Conduct). 
4 Managers may find it impossible to execute share options or 
even sell stock grants of their company.  
5 “The company must inform the public as soon as possible of 
any major new developments in its sphere of activity which are 
not public knowledge and which may, by virtue of their effect 
on its assets and liabilities or financial position or on the 
general course of its business, lead to substantial movements in 
the prices of its shares” (Art. 68). 
companies to disclose negotiations only when they have a 
sufficient degree of certainty, avoiding market 
manipulation.
6 
2.  Inside information, takeover and buying 
shares 
The draft Regulation eliminates, without any consultation 
by the European Commission, the “Whereas 29 and 30” of 
the MAD.
7 
“Whereas 29” provides protection to merger and acquisition 
operations by excluding that communication of inside 
information from the potential target to the potential bidder 
represents a breach of confidentiality that triggers a 
disclosure duty. “Whereas 30”, which has been deemed 
applicable to takeover bids by the ECJ, excludes that the 
bidder has to disclose inside information regarding the 
purpose of launching a takeover.
8 If this was not the case, no 
takeover activity could indeed survive since, once the 
intention of launching a bid was disseminated, the target’s 
market price would immediately increase to a level 
matching the consideration of the bid, thus making the 
acquisition impossible. The combination of “Whereas 29 
and 30” therefore excludes that information concerning the 
intention to launch a bid falls within the disclosure 
obligations of the bidder. 
Both “Whereas” should be reintroduced in the Regulation, 
possibly in Art. 6. 
3.  The treatment of rumours and the 
definition of market manipulation 
Issuers rarely face, in practice, cases involving information 
that can be classified in a clear-cut manner as “inside 
information to be published”, while a decision to publish is 
required in a very short timeframe. In many cases, before 
(the issuer realises that) an obligation to disclose an inside 
information has arisen, rumours
9 spread in the market, in 
some cases causing sudden price variations. 
There is no clear rule either in the existing MAD framework 
or in the proposed framework on how issuers should behave 
                                                        
6 See the ESME report for more detailed solutions dealing with 
the concept of precision; another possible option could be to 
limit the precision of Art. 6.2 in Art. 12, making reference only 
to the existing set of circumstances or events.  
7 Whereas 29 stated that “having access to inside information 
relating to another company and using it in the context of a 
public takeover bid for the purpose of gaining control of that 
company or proposing a merger with that company should not 
in itself be deemed to constitute insider dealing”. Whereas 30 
stated that “since the acquisition or disposal of financial 
instruments necessarily involves a prior decision to acquire or 
dispose taken by the person who undertakes one or other of 
these operations, the carrying out of this acquisition or disposal 
should not be deemed in itself to constitute the use of inside 
information”. 
8 See Moloney, op. cit., pp. 959-960. 
9 Rumours harm market confidence and increase volatility, 
regardless of whether they are true or false. Some considerations on the review of the European market abuse rules |3 
when rumours addressing their securities are spreading.
10 
Member states adopt different approaches: in some 
countries there are “no comment” provisions; in others, 
there is an obligation to comment only if rumours create 
abnormal movement in prices or quantities; in others, only 
‘true’ rumours must be commented upon. 
Uncertainty arises, especially because a sudden obligation to 
comment may result in the disclosure of incomplete or 
misleading information by listed companies. In fact, sending 
(or even attempting to send) “misleading signals” may result 
in a criminal violation.
11 The paradox is that, for an issuer, 
it’s better not to disclose information than to risk disclosure 
of misleading information: the net effect of the proposed 
MAD framework could result in less information available 
to investors, with implications for an efficient price 
formation. 
Given that listed companies are traded on many different 
European platforms and market manipulation rules are 
applicable to them, a common European framework would 
be welcomed. 
Listed companies should be obliged to comment only if two 
conditions obtain: the rumor is true and there are abnormal 
movements in prices or quantities. Otherwise, “no 
comment” policies should be clearly allowed. 
4. Managers’  transactions 
With regard to managers’ transactions, the proposed higher 
threshold for disclosure obligation will significantly reduce 
trades without signalling value. However, it should be 
clarified that every time the threshold is reached, the 
                                                        
10 The third set of CESR Level 3 guidance, with non-binding 
value, states only that when the rumour relates to a piece of 
information that is inside information within the issuer, the 
latter is expected to react and respond to the relevant 
publication or rumour, as that piece of information is 
sufficiently precise to indicate that a leak of information has 
occurred (p. 9). This is the simplest case: the issuer has an 
obligation to comment on (true) rumours to the extent that their 
precision shows a leakage of inside information has occurred: 
rectius the issuers has to disclose the inside information which 
he was possibly delaying because confidentiality is broken. On 
the contrary, “in general, other than in exceptional 
circumstances or unless requested to comment by the 
competent regulator pursuant to Art. 6(7) of MAD, issuers are 
under no obligation to respond to speculation or market 
rumours which are without substance”. Thus, issuers are also 
under no obligation to respond to false rumours. CESR 
considers that this should also apply to publications, e.g. 
articles published in the press or internet postings, which are 
not result of the issuer’s initiative in relation to its disclosure 
obligations. The problem is that issuers often face true rumours 
which are not related to a complete inside information but 
rather relate to a confidential information or to a circumstance 
(not “a set of”) which is true (i.e. true rumours not necessarily 
stemming from a breach of confidentiality). 
11 In fact, even if Art. 5 of the proposed Directive excludes Art. 
4.1 d) which deals with “dissemination of information which 
gives misleading signals”, the reference to 4.a) (“giving 
misleading signals”) may be taken into account by courts. 
calculation of the threshold should restart from zero until the 
limit has been reached again, to avoid insignificant 
notifications to the regulator. Such notification should be 
sent by the relevant people or the companies to the 
competent authorities only, which should decide the rules 
for public access. This would allow for the centralisation of 
information.
12 
The deadline for the communication has been shortened 
(from 5 business days to 2 business days). This may create 
difficulties, in particular: i) if the duty of communication to 
the public also concerns transactions made by persons 
closely associated with managers and to which are be 
notified to the public by the latter; and ii) also considering 
that in many cases issuers notify transactions on behalf of 
managers. 
Maximum harmonisation is in any case necessary. 
5. Insiders’  lists 
With regard to insiders’ lists, their effective utility, at least 
with respect to listed companies, has been questioned. 
Furthermore, an extension of the notion of inside 
information may lead companies to incur relevant costs of 
compliance, especially in multinational listed companies. 
While the Commission, in the consultation paper, reflected 
on the possibility to re-examine the rules in order to 
alleviate these burdens for issuers, it now proposes only to 
exempt issuers on SME growth markets. 
Simplification of insiders’ lists should be applied to listed 
companies or at least to all SMEs, wherever traded 
(regulated markets or MTFs). 
6.  The extension of disclosure obligation to 
MTFs 
It is not appropriate to extend disclosure obligations to 
issuers whose shares are traded on demand only on “listing” 
MTFs. The simplifications foreseen in the proposed market 
abuse (and MiFID) framework are not so relevant. 
Companies choose listing MTFs because there are less 
costly rules with respect to regulated markets. 
Intermediaries and investors know it and behave 
accordingly. While it is possible to extend market abuse 
rules in this case, imposing disclosure obligations would 
limit the possibility for SMEs to raise capital. In any case, a 
possible extension of the disclosure obligation regime 
should be left to member states, with a voluntary application 
by MTFs. This would be easier in case a different notion of 
information (Art. 12) is used. Any different solution could 
be detrimental for raising capital and could raise the costs of 
compliance for companies.
13 
                                                        
12 A similar approach was taken in the draft Regulation on 
short selling. 
13 A scenario for the financial markets that would be 
compatible with the set of Community rules would be a system 
of three steps: i) regulated market “Basic”, dedicated to all 
listed companies with requirements in line with EU directives, 4 | Carmine Di Noia 
7.  Accepted market practices 
The draft Regulation removes the accepted market practices 
(AMPs), which shall remain applicable 12 months after 
entry into application of the Regulation itself.  
The proposed removal of these AMPs, which will imply 
losing benefits of operating in these kinds of “safe 
harbours”, should be reconsidered; many member states 
recognised some AMPs
14 (and some of them have many 
similarities). The European Commission, in its consultation 
paper of 2009, seemed to consider the opportunity to have 
greater convergence in this field, instead of a removal. It 
would be appropriate to keep them and, if necessary, to 
strengthen the ESMA coordination role in order to solve the 
problem of financial instruments traded in more than one 
jurisdiction.
15 
 
                                                                                                  
with a simplified regime governing related party transactions 
and the voluntary adoption of a code of corporate governance; 
ii) a regulated market “Plus” for voluntary membership by all 
companies, large or small, even SMEs, characterised by a very 
strict discipline, even in terms of governance; and iii) an MTF 
for companies not listed on a regulated market, not accessible 
to the retail market and open only to professional investors 
(institutional and private equity), with basic requirements of 
transparency. 
14 Ten AMPs have been published on the ESMA website. 
15 As envisaged by the Commission in the Impact Assessment 
(option 5.5.2, p. 175).  
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